

The Complex Dynamics between German Citizens and Turkish Immigrants

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ABSTRACT: *This article examines the latest immigration trends into Western Europe, particularly the immigration of Turks to Germany. The origins of Turkish immigration and German immigration law are reviewed. Turkey's bid for European Union membership is examined historically and opinions about how this potential European Union member has caused controversy and how Turkey could change the face of the European Union will be discussed. Attitudes of German citizens toward immigrants are examined using data from the European Values Survey (EVS). Tests show that religion and possibly education level play a role in determining the attitude of German citizens toward immigrants, the majority of whom are Turkish.*

Introduction¹

Immigration has always raised concerns for sovereign states. Among these concerns: immigrants may refuse to assimilate, they may decrease the standard of living, crime rates might increase, or they may take jobs away from non-immigrant citizens. One famous focal point of these concerns is along the southern border of the United States and Mexico, but in other areas of the world immigration is just as controversial an issue as it is on the North American Continent.

Western Europe has been experiencing an immigration surge, primarily individuals from underdeveloped Muslim states in the Middle East. Since the 1950s the Muslim population has exploded in Europe, surging from near nothing in 1950, to 50 million in 2009, roughly 7% of the population. France and Germany have been particularly affected, possessing nearly 6 and 3 million Muslims respectively (Kirkwood, 2009). The governments of Western Europe have shown increasing concern attempting to maintain their own unique lifestyle and cultural identity, while also ensuring that human rights and free speech are respected. Still, many citizens of the European Union (E.U.), and the states that comprise it, have concerns about increased immigration. One of the largest segments of the immigrant community comes from Turkey, a secular Muslim state that is currently vying for acceptance into the European Union.

This article will attempt to provide valid and salient information about how citizens of E.U. states, specifically Germany, feel about immigration from Muslim states,

Turkey in particular, but will also examine attitudes toward Turkey's proposed ascension as a member state of the European Union itself. If accepted, Turkey would dramatically alter the demography of the European Union and redefine what it means to be European.

History of Turkish Immigration, German Immigration Laws, and Reform

As the twentieth century progressed, incentives for increased immigration to Europe began to be felt in the Middle East and in Turkey. After WWII, and particularly after the separation of East and West Germany by the Berlin wall in 1961, increased labor shortages, especially in lower class occupations, motivated West Germany to introduce a guest worker (*Gastarbeiter*) program to fill the labor need. The vast majority of workers that immigrated to Germany were Turks (Horn, 2007). Initially these guest workers were allowed into Germany on condition that they would return to their country of origin within three to five years. This arrangement was mutually beneficial. Germany could fill its labor need, while Turks could come to Germany for better wages, a higher standard of living, and improved healthcare. Some even came to escape persecution in their native country or to seek asylum (Razum, Sahin-Hodoglugil, & Polit, 2005).

Unfortunately for Germany, many of the *Gastarbeiter* stayed after their welcome had worn out. The immigrants who did stay in Germany soon were allowed permission for their families to immigrate as well. With immigrant families reunited, soon there were second and third gen-

eration immigrants being born within Germany. One author recounted the old cynic's saying, "there is nothing more permanent than temporary migration," ("Be My Guest," 2005).

Many researchers have studied reasons that Turkish immigrants have given for either remaining in Germany or returning home to Turkey (Anil, 2007; Razum, Sahin-Hodoglugil & Polit, 2005; Doerschler, 2006). Doerschler (2006) provides a simple and near comprehensive list of motives for immigration. Among these are: 1) economic conditions, typically migration from a country with a low economic standard to a higher one for financial gain, 2) political factors, such as suppressed human rights, persecution, and promise of extended liberty in host country, and 3) social contacts in the host country pressure family and friends to immigrate from the native country to the host country. By contrast, Razum et al. (2005) provided motives of Turkish immigrants who may choose to return to their home country. Like a foil to Doerschler's research, the motives to return home typically include a failure to realize one of the goals for initial immigration. Turks may have failed to realize the economic success they had anticipated, so they return home. Other factors for returning to the homeland include the loss of social relations and status, or feeling ostracized; family members may have remained in Turkey; a high risk of occupational hazards; and some even reported that they would prefer to live in an environment that promotes Islam. Out of the some 2 million Turks living in Germany, around 40,000 return to Turkey each year (Razum et al., 2005).

Since the early 1900's, German immigration laws have never made the process of immigration easy. Until the immigration reform of 1999, German citizenship was based strictly on German bloodline (Akturk, 2007). The 1913 immigration laws were a drastic departure from the pre-1913 imperialist rules. Before 1913, the citizenship of ethnic Germans who had lived outside of the country more than ten years was revoked, while immigrants of different ethnicities were allowed citizenship after living in Germany. This changed as the Pan-German League gained influence. After 1913, immigration laws changed focus from determining citizenship based on place of residence to German ethnicity (Akturk, 2007). These sentiments carried through until the end of WWII when the Allies occupied West Germany and the Soviets the East.

After the reunification and stabilization of Germany, the government began taking a closer look at immigration problems. Naturalization rates for foreigners

within Germany never exceeded 3% before 1999. This figure was astonishingly low; however the remarkable fact about this statistic was not the low rate of naturalization. An estimated one fifth of these foreigners living in Germany were born on German soil to immigrants who had begun to reside in the country earlier in the century (Anil, 2007). Unlike the United States, German immigration law before 1999 did not include the principle of *jus soli*; in other words, just because someone was born on German soil they were not granted automatic citizenship rights. Liberal German politicians worked to reform the immigration laws. The result was the Citizenship Reform of 1999. Anil (2007) describes the specifics of the reform:

The 1999 amendment established a minimum requirement of eight years without any age restrictions and set forth criteria an applicant should meet to be naturalised . . . the 1999 changes introduced birthright citizenship (*jus soli*) for the first time in German history. Under the new citizenship policy, a person born in Germany to a foreign parent who has resided in Germany lawfully for eight years or has held an unlimited residency permit for at least three years, is automatically granted German citizenship. Those who are granted German citizenship at birth are allowed to have dual citizenship; however, they have to choose which citizenship to retain before the age of 23. (p.1363-1364)

While the Citizenship Reform of 1999 was a triumph for immigrants and progressives, many Germans felt threatened by the increasing number of Turkish immigrants pouring into the country. European birthrate was and remains very low. So low in fact, that the peoples of France, Germany, Spain, and Great Britain are not producing enough offspring to replenish the natural rate of population decline; however, increased immigration and the high birthrate common among immigrants indicates that there will soon be a dramatic shift in European demography. Some estimate that by 2050 Europe will become a land with a Muslim majority (Kirkwood, 2009). It is safe to assume that many Germans feel that immigrants threaten their national identity. After all, a Germany that is not the land of beer and schnitzel, but instead dominated by towering mosques and calls to prayer would not seem like Germany at all. Conservative German politicians are concerned about this trend and we can be sure that we will see attempts to retain their own national identity while maintaining the delicate balance of free speech and human rights.

Progress and Opposition toward Turkey's entry into the European Union

Turkey's courtship with the European Union began long ago. In 1963, the European Economic Community (EEC), one of the predecessors to the European Union, signed the Association Agreement with Turkey in Ankara. The agreement came in the midst of the Cold War. Turkey was seen as an essential ally by the West against the Soviet Union, but as Turkey moved to implement the stipulations of the agreement and continue to work with the EEC further, the Cold War ended. It seemed that Turkey's value had been reevaluated. In 1987, when Turkey applied for full membership, their plea was largely ignored. Some in the European community cited the substandard human rights conditions in Turkey as an excuse for refusing to consider membership. Since 1987, Turkey's relationship with the EEC, and later the European Union, has been inconsistent at best. The European Union did not even bother inviting Turkey to the Luxembourg Summit in 1997. Official candidacy of Turkey was recognized by the Helsinki European Council in December 1999, however after September 11, 2001, it appeared that the West had reconsidered Turkey's value in the European Union (Tekin, 2005). In October 2005, negotiations were re-opened for Turkey's ascension, however judging from the history of Turkey's E.U. bid, it appears that Turkey is only an attractive candidate for the European Union depending on the benefit they can bring to the West, especially when relating to or resisting Western foes.

Resistance to Turkey's ascension into the European Union is strong particularly in France and Germany. Quantitative evidence of this claim has been seen at the polls in each country. Yilmaz (2007) explains that other scholars conducted a series of tests rating the popularity of potential candidates to the European Union. Respondents from a number of E.U. states, including France and Germany, were asked to rank the other states on a scale from 0 (*no affection*) to 100 (*full affection*). Turkey fared poorly on this scale, scoring only a 42. Only two other states scored lower: Palestine rated 38 (even though Palestine is not officially a sovereign state) and Iran rated 28 (Yilmaz, 2007).

What are the specific objections against Turkey's E.U. bid? Answers are varied. One of the most common is that Turkey simply does not meet the requirements for E.U. membership. In 1993, the Copenhagen European Council established the modern criteria for all states interested in joining the European Union. The

"Copenhagen criteria," as they became known, had a few major stipulations including: 1) "stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities," 2) "the existence of a functioning market economy as well as the capacity to cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the Union," and 3) "the ability to take on the obligations of membership including adherence to the aims of political, economic & monetary union." Additional criteria were established a few years later at the Madrid European Council in December 1995 (European Commission Ascension Criteria, 2009).

Turkey has been making progress meeting the obligations and criteria of the European Union, however there is much work remaining before all the criteria are met. The Commission of the European Communities records the progress of potential E.U. candidates on a yearly basis. According to the report, "Progress is measured on the basis of decisions taken, legislation adopted and measures implemented," however, measures that are pending or have not been brought before Parliament are not included (Commission of the European Communities, p.4). The Commission identified two main areas in which Turkey must make progress to fulfill the E.U. ascension criteria: political and economic.

Progress in the political criteria involves a number of different areas that range from human rights to democratization. Progress to meet the political criteria of the European Union has been significant, but the Commission specified that the central government had not given enough power to local provinces. Because democracy is one of the cornerstones of the European Union, local governments require an increased ability to influence citizens to participate on the local level while assuring a high level of accountability, transparency, and avoiding corruption (Commission of the European Communities, 2008). One key concern is the relationship between civilian politicians and the military. As the Commission's report indicates, "Overall, no progress has been made in ensuring full civilian supervisory functions over the military and parliamentary oversight of defence expenditure. Senior members of the armed forces have made statements on issues going beyond their remit," (p.9).

Perhaps one of the largest concerns for the European Union is the condition of human rights in Turkey. The Commission of the European Communities (2008) report on Turkey contains 17 pages related to Turkey's progress, or lack thereof, with regard to the human rights conditions within Turkey. To put the length of the recommendations in perspective, the report on Turkey's en-

tire economic progress was only five pages long, making the human rights concerns three times longer. Some key human rights changes that must be made include ratification of important human rights treaties, equal access to legal representation, increased freedom of religion, and gender equality. Overall, Turkey has made progress, but there is much more to be done to meet all of the established Copenhagen criteria.

Conservatives in the government maintain a more vehement stance against Turkey's entry into the European Union. They typically express three fundamental differences that would prevent Turkey from ever entering the European Union as a full member. These objections are based on geography, history, and religion. The geographical objection is simple: Turkey is geographically not included within the confines of Europe, but is, rather, part of the Middle East or Western Asia; therefore Turkey should not be considered as a member, at least not a fully fledged member, of the European Union based strictly on geography (Yilmaz, 2007). Critics of this position are keen to point out that there are many other states that can be subjectively included or excluded from Europe. Russia, for example, spans a great distance, well into what most people define as Asia. These critics see Turkey as a key gateway to the East, one in which the European Union has a great stake. When determining if a state should be included in the broad definition of Europe, factors besides geography must be included as well.

Another factor used to determine the "Europeaness" of a state depends on historical context. One reason Russia is included in the definition of Europe is a complex and culturally rich exchange of ideas, literature, and art between Russia and the rest of Europe. Turkey, however, also has historical ties to the Europe, particularly present during the time of the Ottoman Empire. Ottoman control of Constantinople was also influential in establishing a background in Christendom and Western culture; however, even during the time of the Ottomans, the region's primary religion was Islam. The region provides a difficult assessment for those trying to conceive of a dividing line between the West and the East. Turkey is by no means completely Western in its history and culture, but it also has many differences from some of its more Muslim neighbor states. Recalling the influential work of Samuel P. Huntington, author Ali Tekin writes, "Turkish leaders, 'having rejected Mecca, and being rejected by Brussels,' often describe Turkey as a 'bridge' between two cultures and civilisations, physically and philosophically... 'a bridge, however, is an artificial creation con-

necting two solid entities but is part of neither,'" (Tekin, 2005, p. 295–296).

The major and most controversial topic that conservatives use to justify exclusion of Turkey from the European Union is religion. Although Turkey is officially a secular state, some fear that the Islamic majority has molded the government, convincing them to adopt laws in line with *Sharia*, a fundamentalist, traditional, Islamic code. Some Western theorists suggest that Islam and Christianity cannot co-exist in a democracy when one religion, in this case Islam, attempts to force upon others a theocratic form of government. In other words, Europe's background in Judeo Christian morals is diametrically opposed to Islamic morals which do not promote democracy at all but rather misogyny, xenophobia, and intolerance. As author Katherine Pratt Ewing describes it, "Today much of the Western world, including some of its most influential leaders, recognizes 'Islamic civilization' as the only serious challenge to the hegemony of 'Western values.'" This concern is not new. The previously mentioned Samuel Huntington was one of the first to write about the coming clash of cultures (Pratt Ewing, 2003, p. 406). Turkish citizens and others in government also do not deny the extreme influence of Islam in Turkish culture and national identity. In 1986, the Turkish government declared that, "religion, Islam, is one of the core elements of the Turkish culture... religion should be the basis upon which the norms and values of society can be easily established," (Bilir, 2004, p. 263). Many influential religious leaders and politicians continue to hold the view that, "'Turkishness' and Islam go hand in hand," (Bilir, 2004, p. 266).

A religious backlash of sorts seems to be developing in Western Europe against Islamic practices. The theory of this author is that these measures taken against Muslims are a reaction motivated by self preservation. Europeans want to retain their national identity, an identity that has always been tied to their region that is now being threatened by immigrants. The problem with these actions is apparent: in an attempt to preserve their national identity, native Europeans could actually violate their progressive Western values. By singling out the Muslim minority for legislative action they could undermine the democratic values of equal rights; ironically, this is the very thing of which they accuse the Muslim community.

On November 30, 2009, the Swiss government held a referendum considering whether or not minarets—the tall spire usually capped with a crescent on Islamic mosques—should be banned. Surprisingly, the referendum passed overwhelmingly with 57.5% of Swiss vot-

ers approving of the ban. Twenty-two of Switzerland's 26 cantons also approved of the referendum, adding the ban on minarets to the Swiss Constitution, (Higgins, 2009). Resistance to the ban is increasing. France's Foreign Minister Bernard Kouchner, said that the ban amounted to no more than oppression of religion. "It is an expression of intolerance, and I detest intolerance." Many expect this referendum to be overturned by either the Swiss Supreme Court or by the European Convention on Human Rights (Jordans, 2009). Protests developed spontaneously. Demonstrators wielded banners proclaiming: "Das ist nicht meine Schweiz" (This is not my Switzerland).

In the early part of the twenty-first century, many politicians in Europe actively supported Turkey's bid for E.U. membership. Gerhard Schröder and Jacques Chirac, the heads of state for Germany and France respectively, went against popular sentiments as they lobbied for Turkey's successful membership. It was their opinion, in Schröder's words that, "Such historic decisions cannot be made dependent on the whims of changing polls and referendums," (Schoen, 2008 p.345). However, in the 2005 German Federal Election, Schröder was not re-elected. Instead the popular leader of the Christian Democratic Union (CDU), Angela Merkel, was elected as German Chancellor. Merkel and her coalition took a more conservative stance on Turkey's potential rise to the European Union. Likewise, in France, Chirac lost his bid for re-election to Nicolas Sarkozy, another conservative who offered more resistance to the idea of the European Union with Turkey included.

A backlash against progressive immigration policy seems to be growing in Europe. Did the liberal stance of Chirac and Gerhard lead to their loss at the polls? Harald Schoen says yes. Schoen conducted a quantitative analysis of the 2005 German federal election to determine if the public's attitude toward Turkey as a potential member of the European Union affected how they voted. Schoen concluded that the average German voter was concerned about what view politicians had toward Turkey and the European Union, and this view influenced their vote. Overall, more support for Turkey to enter the European Union by a candidate translated into fewer votes from the members of CDU, Christian Social Union (CSU), and the Free Democratic Party (FDP), a lethal combination for former Chancellor Schröder's political career. Of course, Turkey's entry into the European Union was not the sole factor determining the outcome of the election, but it was a significant contributor to the end result.

The 2005 German Federal Election made apparent that German citizens care about whether or not Turkey will enter the European Union. Furthermore, the evidence suggests that Germans are opposed to Turkey's entry into the European Union, but do ethnic Germans within Germany also hold a negative attitude toward Turkish immigrants themselves, and if so, what explains these attitudes? It is the hypothesis of this author that several factors will play a significant role in explaining the attitude of German citizens toward Turkish immigrants. Based on the religious differences between the two cultures, one should expect religious affiliation to play a significant role. Another important factor that could explain these attitudes is the socioeconomic situation of the respondent. Those earning fewer wages may feel anger toward Turkish immigrants for rapidly filling blue collar occupations, and in essence, "stealing" these jobs from ethnic German workers. A higher education level could provide another good predictor. Individuals with higher education tend to drift left on the political spectrum; this results in more support of immigration. Age could be another key predictor. Older Germans are likely to remember a time when there were fewer immigrants and may even remember the original *Gastarbeiter* program. This could relate to negative attitudes toward immigrants. Younger Germans, on the other hand, seem to be more liberal and tolerant than their parents and grandparents. Finally, gender may play a factor, though evidence to support this claim is modest. Based on gender stereotypes, women would have higher levels of support for immigrants while males would have greater hostility.

Data and Methodology

The data for this analysis were drawn from the European Values Study (EVS) 1999/2000, released 2, May 2006,² and were made available online through ZACAT-GESIS Leibniz-Institut für Sozialwissenschaften.³ The EVS is carried out by the European Values Study Foundation and is, "a large-scale, cross-national and longitudinal survey research program. It covers the fields: religion and morality, politics, work and leisure, and primary relations," (ZACAT, 2009). This particular data set was gathered from a random sample of individuals living in Germany. Data were collected during a sit down interview. This author was unable to ascertain if this sample included only German citizens or also those staying in Germany temporarily and others that had been naturalized. Samples from urban and rural areas were also included. The sam-

Table 1. Explaining the Variance of German Citizens' Willingness to Help Immigrants.

	Beta	p
Religious Denomination	-.186	.000*
Sex	.008	.864
Age	-.014	.780
Education Level	-.016	.766
Interview Town Size	.060	.229

*Signicant at .05 level in a two-tailed test.

N=410
R²=.036
Adj. R²=.024

pling process for this data intended to provide a relatively representative sample in order to draw conclusions about the German population as a whole.

Before analyzing the data, several initial steps had to be completed. For this analysis, a rather small number of the variables were used. All of the data were analyzed using SPSS. The hypothesis in question is that Christians, those with low education levels, and a mid to low socio-economic classification will tend to exhibit more negative attitudes to immigrants. Because of the limitations of the data, it was not possible to measure attitudes toward Turkish immigrants in particular because the survey questions apply to all immigrants in general; however it is safe to assume that most immigrants in Germany are of Turkish descent (see previous discussion of immigrant percentages as noted by Razum et al. and Kirkwood). Many of the variable values needed to be recoded in order to represent an accurate analysis. It was common for the EVS data to be recorded on a scale that included

Table 2. Explaining the Variance of German Citizens' Preparedness to do Something for Foreigners.

	Beta	p
Religious Denomination	-.086	.000*
Sex	.017	.431
Age	-.011	.646
Education Level	-.181	.000*
Interview Town Size	.000	.997

*Signicant at .05 level in a two-tailed test.

N=2011
R²=.034
Adj. R²=.032

negative numbers. Because SPSS excludes cases when they are coded as negative numbers, these values had to be changed to prevent skewed results. For instance, one survey question recorded the religious denomination of the respondent; however respondents who indicated they had no religious affiliation were coded as a negative number. Nearly 40% of Germans in the sample answered that they were not part of a religious denomination. If these cases were excluded from the results the analysis would be distorted.

Missing data was a major problem. In order to measure how Germans felt about helping immigrants several variables were combined into one scale. Is helping immigrants a moral duty (v286); do you sympathize with immigrants (v287); is helping immigrants in the best interest of society (v288); will you help immigrants if it is in your own interest (v289); and will you help immigrants if they do something in return (v290)? Out of the 2036 respondents, only 1601–1615 answered the questions concerning immigrants. Even more astonishingly—and this was the root of the trouble analyzing the data—only 421–435 chose an answer that was valid. The majority of individuals who took the survey (approximately 78.2%) answered “not applicable.”

Despite the much lower number of cases, linear regression was used to determine which variables accounted for the variance in the re-computed variable measuring the combined willingness to help immigrants (*helpimmscale*).

The results of the regression were disappointing. The only variable that was statistically significant was the religious denomination of the respondent. This test only explained a minute 2.4% of the total variance (*adj. R²=.024*).

Not willing to give up on more analysis, another variable was tested to determine if the data supported the hypothesis of this article. This variable (v279a_de) had the potential to be a good indicator of the attitudes of German citizens toward immigrants. The variable explanation *Bereitschaft, etwas für Ausländer etwas zu tun* (Preparedness to do something for foreigners) could be a good indicator of attitudes of Germans towards foreigners in the country. The advantage of this variable, unlike the previous test, was that nearly all the respondents (2011) provided a valid response. Use of this variable widened the measure of attitudes to include not only those individuals living in Germany as guest workers, naturalized citizens, and so forth, but also every individual associated with a foreign group or ethnicity in Germany, regardless of time spent there.

The results of the two tests were similar; the reported religious denomination of the respondent was still a significant predictor of preparedness to do something for foreigners. Similarly, sex, age, and size of the town where the interview was conducted (our measure of relative rural/urban) were not significant in explaining preparedness to do something for foreigners. However, unlike the last test, the highest education level of the respondent was a significant predictor. In addition, although the R^2 scores for the two tests were similar (.036 versus .034), the gap between the *adj. R²* had closed significantly. This may be attributed to the larger number of cases in the second test.

Results

What can one conclude based on these tests? Based on the results, many of the hypotheses of this paper have been rejected. First, the hypothesis that a lower socioeconomic status results in significant negative opinions about immigrants must be rejected. In both tests socioeconomic status of the respondent played little to no roll in predicting the attitude of the average German toward immigrants, neither did gender, or age, which is surprising considering that older Germans remember the creation of the guest workers program and may feel threatened by the changing demographics in Germany.

The factors that do seem to describe German attitudes toward immigrants are religion and highest education level of the respondent; although, with both of these variables, the results were puzzling. First, the relationships between religious denomination and both of the dependent variables were negative, meaning as the value for the dependent variables rose, the value of the religious denomination fell. A higher score on the variable *helpimmscale* translated into more willingness to help immigrants. The lower the score on religious denomination the more agnostic or atheist the respondent. According to the test, atheists, agnostics, or those who do not associate with any religion are, in general more likely *not* to be willing to help immigrants. By the same token, the second test results were very similar. A lower score of preparedness to do something for foreigners was associated more with atheists, agnostics, and those who do not associate with any religion. This result is contradictory to the hypothesis posed by this paper. It was hypothesized that Christians would generally hold more negative attitudes toward immigrants based on the fact that the majority of immigrants are Muslim. Religious differences and feel-

ing threatened by a growing Muslim population *did not* translate into low Christian support for immigrants. This result is unexpected because all the evidence points to Christian resistance (see discussion of the Swiss minaret ban above).

When the highest education level of the respondent was regressed with *helpimmscale* the results of the test were not significant. This suggested that education was not a good predictor at determining an average German's willingness to help immigrants. However this result, unlike the results for religious denomination, was not similar to the outcome of the second test. In the second test, the highest educational level of respondent was a significant predictor in determining the average German's preparedness to do something for foreigners. The relationship between highest level of education and preparedness to help foreigners was negative, meaning as the score of preparedness to help increased, the score for highest level of education decreased. In the second test, the results appear to support the hypothesis. As the level of education falls—the less education an individual has—the more likely that the respondent is not prepared to do something for foreigners. One explanation for this result is that individuals with higher education tend to be more progressive with regard to immigration laws, while individuals with less education are more conservative and are generally not in favor of immigration but prefer to maintain a close-knit national identity. However, it cannot be ignored that when education was used as a predictor in the first test, the results were not significant. This, along with the low R^2 score in both tests, suggests that these results should be viewed skeptically. More conclusive data should be collected and analyzed before any conclusion about the true relationship between education and attitudes towards immigrants can be made.

Conclusion

Much more research is required to determine the attitudes of Europeans toward immigrants. What factors describe the majority of the variance in these tests? When we discover them, what significance will the findings have on the immigration debate? Europeans are undergoing an identity crisis. What will it mean to be European if Muslims become the majority by 2050? Turkey's pending ascension to the European Union has only exacerbated this identity crisis.

The immigration debate in Europe will most certainly be embedded in international headlines for the next few

decades. In the meantime, it is important for social scientists to keep studying the complex dynamics between nationality, geography, ethnicity, and how these factors affect the relationships inside and outside sovereign states. Some authors suggest that we are moving into a period of postnationalism, where nationality is no longer tied to geography; others disagree (see Baban, 2006).

The future of Turkey and the European Union is also uncertain. As long as Europeans feel that their way of life is threatened by immigrants, there is little chance that Turkey, or any other Muslim state, will gain entry into the European Union in the near future. But with exploding Muslim and other immigrant populations, it will not be long before these minorities will not be able to be ignored and will have the power to shape policy through democratic pressure. Europeans must find a way to be proud

about their ethnicity while accepting immigrants. At the same time, pride for European States by their citizens must also undergo a radical change. It is possible to be a patriotic German Muslim. Of course, there are legitimate concerns about the violent temperament of some minorities. Democratic values should be protected appropriately. Native Europeans must not fight hate with hate, but instead, must pave the way for improved relations between all ethnic and national groups. Europe is undergoing a crisis of self identity, but with careful defense of Western values and respect for others, they will adapt.

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Notes

1. I would like to thank all those who contributed to this paper by offering suggestions, encouragement, and support.
2. The online catalogue number for this data set is ZA3778.

3. Naturally, the views of ZACAT, the Leibniz-Institut für Sozialwissenschaften, or the European Value Study Foundation have not been expressed in any way by the analysis of this paper. The author bears complete responsibility for the conclusion and interpretation.

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